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THE STANDARD OF CARE REQUIRED OF SAVINGS BANK DIRECTORS
The directors of a savings bank occupy a fiduciary relation
toward their depositors." Two views are held, however, as to
the technical conception of this office. One is that a trust is
implied in fact from the acts of the parties in assuming their
respective positions. The other view holds that the director in
taking this office has thrust upon him by law, as if by specific
stipulation, responsibilities as exacting as those of an express
trustee. Whether one agrees with the majority opinion in the
case of Lippett v. Ashley 2 in sustaining the former conception,
or that of dissenting Judge Wheeler, supported by the decision
in Greenfield Savings Bank v. Abercrombie,3 it is undeniable that
in either case certain fundamental duties are involved in the
'Dickson v. Baker, 77 N. W. 820; 75 Minn. 168.
'Lippett v. Ashley, 94 At. (Conn.) 995.
'Greenfield Savings Bank v. Abercroinbie, 211 Mass. 252.
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office. In caring for and investing funds of the depositors he is
bound to exercise at least that degree of diligence and good faith
which should govern the conduct of agents generally;4 he may
be sued by depositor or assignee for misappropriation of funds,'
and will be held personally liable for wilfully co~perating with
other directors in declaring dividends where there are no surplus
profits.6
As to the question of negligence and a director's liability there-
for, the judges in the principal case did not agree. The lower
court held that a failure of the directors to require a trial balance,
by which the embezzlement might readily have been discovered,
did not constitute negligence. The majority of the Supreme
Court of Errors reversed this decision, holding that due perform-
ance of the duty of reasonable care involved at least a compliance
with the statutes of the State, the by-laws of the corporation,
and the usages of the business. Accordingly, it decided that the
omission of an ordinary precaution, such as this trial balance, is
prima facie evidence of a want of reasonable care. Williams v.
McKay7 goes even further in holding the directors liable for
money secretly withdrawn by others and covered by false entries,
in spite of their having examined the books.
The dissenting opinion holds that bank directors acting bona
fide need use only ordinary care and are liable to stockholders
only for gross neglect. Such is the explicit rule of Jones v.
Johnson.8 Though this distinction, like all involving degrees of
negligence, is unsatisfactory, it furnishes a real point of differ-
ence, as may be seen in the decisions which tend to follow the
latter view. The case of Wallace v. Lincoln Savings Bank'
asserts that this ordinary diligence required of bank directors is
that exercised by prudent men about their own affairs. In fact,
the English case of Turquand v. Marshall' authorizes the holding
that directors, however indiscreet, are not personally liable for
their official acts so long as not fraudulent.
'Greenfield Savings Bank v. Simons, 133 Mass. 415.
'Rice v. Howard, 136 Cal. 432; 69 P. 77.
'Van Dyck v. McQuade, 57 How. Prac. 62; 45 N. Y. Super. Ct. 62o;
N. H. Trust Co. v. Doherty, 75 Conn. 555.
' Williams v. McKay, 46 N. J. E. 25; 18 AtI. 824.
S ones v. Johnson, 86 Ky. 530; Brinkerhof v. Bostwick, 88 N. Y. 52.
'Wallace v. Lincoln Savings Bank, 89 Tenn. 63o.
" Turquaiid v. Marshall, L. R. 4 Ch. 386. Overend and G. Co. v. Gibb,
L. R. 5 H. L. 494.
COMMENTS
The rule that the standard of care required of bank directors
is that which a reasonably prudent man would exercise under
similar circumstances has much to recommend it. First, it is
the rule in other cases involving negligence. Secondly, it gives
the jury a proper reminder of the relation of circumstances to
the degree of prudence required. Finally, any other rule would
necessarily be misleading. For instance, "that care exercised by
a reasonably prudent man in the conduct of his own business"
would imply to a jury that they should judge the liability of bank
directors by a standard which is arbitrary and inflexible. It
seems to take no account of the self-evident truth that different
kinds of business vary in the degree of care required to con-
stitute reasonable prudence on the part of those conducting
them.
On the other hand this very arbitrary standard has a distinct
advantage in that it gives the jury a definite starting point. To
say that the standard of care required of a bank director is that
of a reasonably prudent bank director leads us nowhere. It begs
the whole question at issue. But a start from the degree of care
exercised by a reasonably prudent man in the conduct of his own
business is a start from a comparatively settled point and takes
at least a step toward defining his duty. Note that this does not
require him to take the same concrete precautions as a bank
manager that he would, e. g., in his private coal business. But
it does clearly require him to have the interests of his directorship
as much at heart as if it were his own concern, and thus exercise
the same degree of care along bankers' lines that he does as an
individual in his own affairs.
C. B.
S. B.
DELIVERY OF A CHECK AS A GIFT FOLLOWED BY THE DEATH OF
DONOR BEFORE PRESENTMENT AT THE BANK
Decedent, intending to make a gift, drew his check for twenty
thousand dollars to the order of his daughter and delivered it
to her. She delivered it to her bank, which collected it, after
her father's death, from the trust company on which it was
drawn, and paid the proceeds to her. The court held that by
delivery of the check the daughter became the testator's agent to
withdraw the amount called for by the check and that her author-
ity was revoked by his death and consequently she must restore
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the amount thereof to the estate.' As it seems unjust to deprive
the daughter of what her father intended to give her, it
becomes important to ascertain whether the decision in this case
is well grounded in principle.
While it is generally true that equity will not aid a volunteer,
this doctrine applies only when the volunteer is invoking the
court's aid as against the donor oi: one holding for value. This is
illustrated in the case of McMechan v. Warburton,2 where after
the death of the donor, equity rectified a voluntary deed so as to
make it include certain property that the donor intended to give
to the donee and which the donor up to her death supposed to
have been transferred by the deed. And so here, the father
supposed that the delivery of the check would fully carry out his
intention of making his daughter the recipient of this money and
no change of intention was indicated prior to his death. Is not
the daughter in a stronger position than the donee in McMechan
v. Warburton? For the daughter had received the money from
the bank, thus getting legal title. The estate, in seeking to recover
this, does so on the theory that she has money to which it is
ex aequo et bono entitled. But inasmuch as she has an equitable
claim in addition to legal title, she should be allowed to retain it.
Apparently this view was not presented, for the court decided
against the daughter on the ground that the death of the drawer
revokes the agency of the payee. It is submitted that this view
of a check is erroneous. The payee, in withdrawing money by
means of the check, acts entirely for himself and not for another.
There is no agreement requiring the payee t6 do anything for
the drawer. The check does amount to an authorization to the
bank to pay out the sum indicated and thereby extinguish its
indebtedness to the depositor pro tanto. Death revokes this
authority and the payment made in this case after the father's
death was unauthorized. Notwithstanding this, the bank, not
knowing of the death, is protected on the ground of practical
convenience, because it is impossible for the bank to ascertain
whenever a check is presented to it whether the drawer is still
alive.3 So that if the giving of the check in this case was only
an authority to the bank, though the bank would be protected,
the estate would be entitled to the money received by the donee
as money paid under mistake of fact by the agent of the drawer.
.In re Mead, 154 N. Y. S. 667.
1L. R. Ireland, i Ch. Div. 435.
'Glennan v. Rochester Trust Co., 2o9 N. Y. 12.
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We are now confronted by the problem as to whether the
giving of a check may constitute more than a mere authority to
the bank to pay. A deposit of money in the bank creates a
debt against the bank. Has the depositor power to divest him-
self gratuitously of a part of this claim in favor of a third party?
He can of course cash his own check and make a gift of the
money, or the bank may pay it pursuant to his authority. But
are these the only methods by which he can give away part of
his interest in the claim due from the bank? Can it not be done
by the delivery of a check?
At early common law a chose in action could not be assigned,
even for value. Later, courts of law permitted the assignee to
sue in the assignor's name. In Coke's time an assignment of a
chose in action was deemed valid only when made to a creditor
and providing an express power of attorney was given. But
later a power of attorney was implied in favor of the assignee
even in the case of a donee. 4 So that now a gift may be made by
mere delivery of the instrument without a witness; as for
example a bond,5 a life insurance policy, a promissory note of
a third person,7 shares Qf stocks," and savings bank deposits.
And a gift of a claim not evidenced by a writing may also be
made by means of a sealed instrument. 0
The power to give being now as clearly recognized as an
incident to the enjoyment of property rights as is the power to
sell, there can be no sound reason for holding that a man cannot
make an irrevocable gift of a part of a claim against a bank
which will be valid as between the donor and donee. But how
shall the gift be made? The intention to give is alone inoperative
to create a gift. A delivery must be made so as to constitute a
present transfer of the thing to be given. But the delivery of a
chose in action is necessarily different from the delivery of a
corporeal thing, where the res may be physically transferred. In
all cases the delivery must be as complete and perfect as the nature
of the property will permit. The check drawn by the donor is
evidence created by him of the bank's liability. This is a means
"Kenneson's Cases on the Law of Trusts, p. 71 (note).
*Elam v. Keene, 4 Leigh (Va.) 333.
'Traveler's Ins. Co. v. Grant's Adm., 54 N. J. Eq. 208.
Wing v. Merchant, 57 Me. 383.
'First Nat. Bank of Richmond v. Holland, 99 Va. 495.
'Camp's Appeal, 36 Conn. 88.
"Matson v. Abbey, 141 N. Y. i79.
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by which the donee may obtain possession of the ultimate object
intended for him,"1 and a physical tradition of the check is the
best delivery of which the property represented by it is capable.
It is true that in the cases above enumerated, an action at law
is permitted in the assignor's name. The payee of a check not
being able to sue the bank which refuses to pay, the inference
is drawn that this is due to the fact that a check cannot constitute
an assignment. But this conclusion does not necessarily follow.
A check is ordinarily drawn for part of the claim, so that if an
assignment at all were possible, it would be a partial assignment.
In the case of a partial assignment, the assignee would have no
claim in a court of law because a debtor owing one debt should
be subject to only one action therefor and cannot without his
consent be subjected to the splitting up of that indebtedness so
as to be liable to several actions. Is not the situation of the
bank here analogous to the case where, as part of the contract
between the creditor and debtor, it is stipulated that the creditor
shall not have the power to assign? There the assignee has no
rights as against the debtor but the assignment is not void to
all intents and purposes, for equity holds the assignor to be a
constructive trustee of the claim in favor of the assignee.12 So
that the immunity of the bank from suit by the payee does not
preclude the possibility of a good assignment as between assignor
and assignee.
But it may be said that the giving of a check has not deprived
the donor of dominion over the money in the bank, for he could
immediately countermand payment and so the gift is incomplete.
This may be answered by saying that control over the claim to
the exclusion of the donor is not necessary. For example, where
a deed of gift of a promissory note of a third party was delivered
to the donee, the latter could recover from the estate of the donor,
which had collected the note.18 Similarly where a rule of a bank
requires withdrawal by the depositor or upon his order, a delivery
of a bank book without any writing is a good gift as between the
parties.' 4
11Marsh v. Fuller, 18 N. H. 36o (key to chest constituted good delivery
of contents on the theory that it gave the means to obtain property).
124 Yale Law Journal 59o; Devlin v. Mayor, 63 N. Y. 8, 17; Staples v.
Somerville, 176 Mass. 237; Mueller v. N. W. Univ., 195 Ill. 236.
" Walker v. Crews, 73 Ala. 412.
"Hall v. Stevenson, 63 Me. 364.
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If the father declared himself a trustee of part of his claim
against the bank in favor of his daughter, equity would enforce
the trust, and it is worthy of notice that this method has the net
force and effect of a gift. What magic, however, is there in
this declaration of trust that gives the beneficiary a better right
than in the case where there is an unequivocal intention of making
a gift and, pursuant to that intention, a check is executed and
delivered with the purpose of passing a present interest, just as
if so much money was actually delivered? The moment it is
conceded that a present interest can be transferred by the delivery
of a check, the death of the donor can have no more effect on
this gift than in the case of the declaration of trust.
5
M. H. L.
ARE SECONDARY CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS GOVERNED BY THE
LAW OF THE CONTRACT?
A contract was made in Mexico for the shipment of goods
thence to New York. By the Mexican law rights of action under
such contracts are extinguished six months after completion of
the carriage. Action was brought in New York after the lapse
of- such period. Held, that the New York law, and not that of
Mexico, governed as to the survival of the right of action.'
Such a limitation is universally held to destroy the right, and
not merely, as a matter of procedure, to bar the remedy.
2 The
law of the forum, as such, has therefore no application to the
case. By the decisive weight of authority, a contract of carriage
contemplating performance in more than one jurisdiction, is gov-
erned, as to its primary obligatioh, by the law of the place of
making.3 The principal case must therefore be taken as deciding
that secondary contractural obligations are governed by the law
of the place of breach as such, and not by the "proper law of
the contract."
If the "law of the contract" be taken in the sense of the law
creating the primary obligations, it is impossible to conceive how
"hMay v. Jones, 87 Iowa 188.
'N. Y. & Cuba Mail S. S. Co. v. Maldonado & Co., 225 Fed., 353.
Rogers, J. dissenting.
'Neganbauer v. Ry., 92 Minn. 184; Baker v. Stonebraker's Adm'r.,
36 Mo. 338.
'Liverpool Steam Co. v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 129 U. S. 397; Brockway
v. Ans. Express Co., 171 Mass. i58. Contra, Barter v. Wheeler, 49 N. H. 9.
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that law can give legal effect to the acts of the parties without
simultaneously creating the secondary legal relation. Without
the latter no contract is formed, for without them the so-called
primary obligation would be undistinguishable from purely moral
duties. Both classes of obligations, therefore, clearly originate
from the same law.4
By what law, then, should the secondary obligation be con-
strued? In the absence of an actual or presumed intention of
the parties to the contrary, no other law than that which creates
the duties, primary.and secondary, can be held to determine of
what they consist. Given, however, a presumed intention of the
parties in favor of either the law of the place of making or the
law of the place of performance as decisive of the primary inci-
dents of a contract, the same presumption ought in reason to be
extended to the secondary obligation. A very real presumption
supports the proposition that no party would intend the two
classes of obligations to be governed by different laws.5 Parties
seldom have in mind the distinction between the primary and
secondary rights and duties. Moreover, sound business con-
siderations favor a uniformity of rule, as minimizing the field
of possible misunderstanding and litigation. In addition, grave
practical difficulties would ensue from a contrary treatment.
Many contracts, consisting of negative undertakings not localized,
admit of no predetermination of the place of breach, and con-
sequently, under the view here criticized, of the nature of the
secondary obligation. Still others, consisting of affirmative
undertakings not localized, would admit of no localization of the
breach even after occurrence.
We must conclude that the secondary obligation of a contract
should be governed either by the lex loci contractus or by the
lex loci solutionis, according as the former or the latter governs
the primary obligation.
Several direct decisions support these contentions. In numer-
ous other cases where the law of the contract in fact coincided
with the law of the place of breach the same rule of decision was
"See Pritchard v. Norton, lo2 U. S. 124, i29; Atwood v. Walker, 179
Mass. 514, 518-9.
For a recognition of this presumption see cases cited in re 2 supra.
"Davis v. Mills, 194 U. S. 451, 454 (survival of right of action gov-
erned by law of place of making); Ry. Co. v. Gebhard, lO9 U. S. 527
(discharge); Morgan v. Ry. Co. 2 Woods (Circuit) 244 (right to
rescind).
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followed.7 "Whatever goes to the substance of the obligation
and affects the rights of the parties, as growing out of the con-
tract itself, or inhering in it, or attaching to it, is governed by
the law of the contract."" "All the incidents pertaining to the
validity and construction (of contracts) . . . and the rule of
damages for failure to perform such contract, will be governed by
the lex loci contractus."9 "The general rule as to the law which
governs a contract is that the law of the country either where
the contract was made, or where it is to be so performed that it
must be considered to be a contract of that country, is the law
which governs such a contract; not merely with regard to its
construction but with regard to all the conditions applicable to
it as a contract. I say 'applicable to it as a contract' to exclude
mere matters of procedure which do not affect the contract as
such, but relate merely to the procedure of the court in which
litigation may take place upon the contract."'1
A few judicial utterances support the principal cases." All,
however, have reference to damages for the non-payment of
negotiable instruments, a class of cases in which the law of the
place of performance is generally held to control the construction
of the piimary obligation itself.
Both on principle and on authority, therefore, the same law
should be held to govern "(i) as to the primary obligation of
the contract, (2) as to the secondary obligation of the contract,
(3) and as to the discharge of the secondary obligation."'
12
C. R. W.
"Ptitchard v. Norton, supra; Atwood v. Walker, supra; Gibbs v.
Soci ti Industrielle, 22 Q. B. D. 399, 405; Coghlan v. Ry. Co., I42 U. S.
Ioi, 1Io ff.; Slater v. Ry. Co., 194 U. S. 120, 126; Ry. Co. v. Bab-
cock, 31 Minn. II, 13; Meyer v. Ester, 164 Mass. 457, 465; Greenwald v.
Kaster, 86 Pa. 45, 47; Pecks v. Mayo, 14 Vt. 33, 36; Gibbs v. Fremont,
9 Ex. 25, 28.
'Pritchard v. Norton, supra, 129.
'Atwood v. Walker, supra, 518-9.
10 Gibbs v. Sociit Industrielle, supra, 405.
11 Cooper v. Waldegrave, 2 Beav. 282, 284; Healey v. Gorman, I5 N. J. L.
328, 329; Ex parte Heidelbach, 2 Low. (U. S. Circuit) 526, 536. See also
Beale, J. H., in 1O Harv. Law Rev. 168, 171, 173-4, and Summary in
Cases on Conflict of Laws, III, § 54, §§ 96-97.
'Prin. case, dissenting opinion of Rogers, Circuit J., 358.
